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 1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship is generally recognized as a key factor for economic devel-
opment.1 At the same time, the literature emphasizes that entrepreneurship
is a very heterogeneous concept. For example, entrepreneurs di⁄er in their
motivations for starting a business, in their legal status, in their aspirations.2
We expect such characteristics to be a signi￿cant determinant of entrepre-
neurs￿capacity to create jobs, innovation and generate economic growth
(see Wennekers and Thurik (1999), Reynolds et al. (2002), Stel, Carree and
Thurik (2005)).
In this paper, we focus on a basic distinction between more or less pro-
ductive entrepreneurs.3 Individual productivity depends crucially on two
dimensions. Entrepreneurial talent, which determines the output an indi-
vidual can produce for a given technology, and access to more or less pro-
ductive technologies. We then take the view that economic development
requires an e¢ cient allocation of talent, i.e. it requires that the most pro-
ductive technologies are controlled by those who can get the most out of
them.
One may think of several obstacles to such e¢ cient matching, includ-
ing corrupt bureaucracies, lack of information, or distorted incentives. We
here concentrate on credit constraints. More productive technologies typ-
ically require a minimal capital investment in order to operate, so it may
be impossible for poor individuals to access them, however talented these
individuals may be. The severity of credit constraints will then a⁄ect, and
will be a⁄ected by, the extent to which the most talented individuals have
access to the most productive technologies, which in turn determines the
level of economic development.
The aim of the paper is twofold. First, to analyze in a simple model how
the interaction between entrepreneurial talent, production technologies and
credit constraints determines the process of economic development. Second,
to explore in such setting which forces may impede ￿nancial development,
as determined in equilibrium, and then show how underdevelopment traps
may arise.
For this purpose, we ￿rst build an occupational choice model in which
individuals di⁄er in their wealth and entrepreneurial talent. There are two
ways in which production can take place. First, it can take place in ￿rms, and
1As it is well known, this proposition goes back at least to Schumpeter (1934). van
Praag and Versloot (2007) provide a recent review on the evidence of the economic value
of entrepreneurship.
2See for example Reynolds, Bygrave, Autio, Cox and Hay (2002) on necessity vs. op-
portunity entrepreneurs; Schneider and Enste (2000) on formality vs. informality; Berner,
Gomez and Knorringa (2008) on survival vs. growth enterprises.
3Less productive entrepreneurs will sometimes be called unproductive, which empha-
sizes that they may produce just enough to survive. This should however not be confused
with rent-seeking activities.
2this requires a minimal amount of capital and salaried workers to operate.
The lower is ￿nancial development, the higher is the collateral required to
get a loan, and so the lower is the fraction of individuals who can consider
setting up a ￿rm. Second, production can take place in one-man businesses.
These require no capital investment and no employee to operate, but they
are constrained by ine¢ ciently small scale of production.4
Depending on their wealth and talent, individuals then choose whether
to set up a ￿rm (and become entrepreneurs), run a one-man business (and
become self-employed) or look for a job as employee in one of these ￿rms.
In this setting, relaxing credit constraints allows some poor individuals to
access credit and set up a ￿rm. This increases competition and the demand
for labor, which in turn decreases the incentive to set up a ￿rm for less
talented individuals. Hence, the rich and untalented are induced to look
for a salaried job while at the same time the poor and talented can become
entrepreneurs. That is, ￿nancial development changes both the structure
of production, as more individuals become entrepreneurs and less become
self-employed, and it induces a more e¢ cient allocation of entrepreneurial
talent to production technologies. Both mechanisms generate an higher level
of production.
We then enrich our framework in order to explore the impediments to
￿nancial development. In particular, we derive the level of ￿nancial develop-
ment as an equilibrium outcome of a setting in which ￿nancial development
depends on individual incentives to misbehave, which are a⁄ected by labor
market conditions, and these in turn depend on the level of ￿nancial devel-
opment. The purpose is to address the question of why countries may end
up with low levels of ￿nancial development and then to highlight a possible
mechanism behind underdevelopment traps.
The basic ingredients are standard. First, individual interest to get a loan
need not be aligned with banks￿interest to get the loan repaid. In particular,
we assume that individuals may ask for capital and not invest it e¢ ciently,
as this generates private bene￿ts (as e.g. in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)).5
Second, banks ￿nd it very di¢ cult to detect ex-ante those individuals who
ask for loans even if they will not repay. In particular, we assume that, while
pro￿ts are veri￿able, banks cannot observe entrepreneurial talent. Hence,
as usual, banks need a su¢ ciently high collateral in order to make sure that
entrepreneurs will not to misbehave. In this setting, however, the required
level of collateral is determined by, and at the same it determines, labor
market conditions.
These interlinkages open the possibility of multiple equilibria. If entre-
4See for example Banerjee and Du￿ o (2008) for a detailed account of this type of
self-employment in developing countries.
5There are several other reasons why this could happen. For example, in a setting in
which pro￿ts are stochastic, entrepreneurs may take too much risk as they are protected
by limited liability or as they overestimate their probability of success.
3preneurs are a few, labor demand is low so individuals may ask for a loan
even if not particularly talented, since their outside option is poor. This
means that banks face many potentially problematic requests and they have
to ask for high levels of collateral to screen applicants. This in turn sustains
low levels of entrepreneurship. Conversely, if entrepreneurs are many, labor
demand is high so the probability of ending up with a salaried job is high
and only talented individuals ask for loans. Receiving a few problematic
requests, banks do not need an high collateral, which in turn sustains high
rates of entrepreneurship.
It follows that countries with very similar initial conditions may experi-
ence very di⁄erent levels of development. Consider for example two countries
with the same low level of ￿nancial development and with slightly di⁄erent
wealth distributions. In the ￿rst country, basically no one is wealthy enough
to set up a ￿rm. In the second country, instead, there are a few wealthy
individuals who can set up a ￿rm even without asking for a loan. If one
then tries to increase ￿nancial development, the ￿rst country will face se-
vere agency problems, for the reasons just explained, and as a result it will
get stuck in an equilibrium with low ￿nancial development, low entrepre-
neurship and low production. The second country instead will converge to
an equilibrium with high ￿nancial development, high entrepreneurship and
high production. As we show in Section 5, the di⁄erence in initial wealth
distributions between the two countries can be minimal and still lead one
country to take o⁄ and the other to stagnate.
2 Relation with the literature
This paper is linked to several streams of literature. First, it builds on mod-
els of occupational choice in which entrepreneurial talent is heterogeneous,
as pioneered by Lucas (1978).6 In particular, we focus on the allocation of
entrepreneurial talent across occupations with di⁄erent productivity, as in
the spirit of Baumol (1990), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991), Acemoglu
(1995) and Holmes and Schmitz (2001). This literature typically emphasizes
distortions in the structure of rewards within a society, while we focus on
credit constraints as an impediment to the e¢ cient allocation of talent.
Second, this work relates to the literature on the e⁄ects of ￿nancial de-
velopment (see Levine (2005) for a recent survey), and speci￿cally to models
analyzing occupational choices with credit constraints and nonconvex pro-
duction technologies (see e.g. Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion and
Bolton (1997), Ghatak and Jiang (2002); and Banerjee (2003) for a review).
Similarly to these models, we emphasize how initial conditions, and specif-
ically the distribution of wealth, may lead to poverty traps. However, we
6See e.g. Parker (2004) and Bianchi and Henrekson (2005) for a review of such models
of entrepreneurship.
4consider individuals with di⁄erent entrepreneurial talent and then focus on
the allocation of talent across occupations.
A closely related approach is taken by Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000),
who formalize the process of development as driven by the interaction be-
tween entrepreneurial e¢ ciency and credit constraints. In such model, de-
pending on the distribution of entrepreneurial e¢ ciency, the economy can
reach an equilibrium with an e¢ cient structure of production or get stuck
with a dual structure in which some individuals remain employed in a sub-
sistence agricultural sector. We share these basic mechanisms, but our focus
is more in how the process of development depends on credit constraints and
in how equilibria with low ￿nancial development may be sustained.
Last, by deriving access to credit as an equilibrium outcome, we may
contribute to literature on the determinants of ￿nancial development. The
role of institutions and in particular of legal origins has been widely empha-
sized. La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), and a vast
ensuing literature, argue that better investor protection allowed for greater
￿nancial market development in common law countries. More recently, po-
litical economy distortions have been documented: ￿nancial development,
despite boosting e¢ ciency, is likely to create winners and losers. If losers,
say incumbent ￿rms, are su¢ ciently powerful, then the process of develop-
ment may be blocked (see Rajan and Zingales (2003)). While this view is
consistent with the dynamics of our model (pro￿ts of incumbent entrepre-
neurs will decrease with ￿nancial development), we take a complementary
route and derive underdevelopment traps from standard economic reasons,
i.e. moral hazard and information asymmetry.
3 The model
The economy is populated by a continuum n of risk-neutral individuals, who
are heterogeneous in terms of initial wealth a and entrepreneurial talent t:7
Wealth is drawn from a cumulative distribution function F with support on
R+; talent from a cumulative distribution function G with support on the
interval [t;￿ t] in R+. These draws are assumed to be statistically independent.
In addition, each individual is endowed with one unit of labor, which he can
use as follows: he can set up a ￿rm, look for a job as employee of such ￿rm,
or run a one-man business. We now describe these options in further detail.
3.1 Production technologies
There is a single good in the economy which can be produced by ￿rms and
by one-man businesses. We assume that each ￿rm has the same size in
7We here abstract from di⁄erent attitudes toward risk as a driving force of occupational
choices (see Kihlstrom and La⁄ont (1979) for a formalization of this view and Bianchi and
Henrekson (2005) for a discussion).
5terms of capital and labor, it employs k units of capital and l workers.8 The
output produced depends however on entrepreneurial talent. A ￿rm run by
an individual with talent t produces tf(k;l) units of output, where f(k;l) is
a common production technology.9 We normalize f(k;l) = 1; so the pro￿t
of one such ￿rm writes as
￿ = pt ￿ wl ￿ rk; (1)
where p denotes the price of the good, w denotes workers￿wage, and r is
the market interest rate.
If the capital investment falls short of k; production can only take place
in one-man businesses. These businesses require no capital, no employees,
and their output does not depend on entrepreneurial talent.10 In order to
emphasize that production in these businesses is ine¢ cient, we take the
extreme view that an individual who run a one-man business can get just
enough for his own consumption (and we normalize such quantity to zero).11
Individuals who set up a ￿rm are called entrepreneurs, they enjoy utility
U1 = ￿; and we denote their population share with x1: Individuals who
work as employee in one such ￿rms are called workers, they enjoy utility
U2 = w and we denote their population share with x2: Individuals who run
a one-man business are called self-employed, they enjoy utility U3 = 0 and
their population share is denoted with x3.
3.2 Markets
There are three markets in our economy: a labor market, a product market,
and a credit market. In the labor market, the wage w is ￿xed and exogenous,
which implies that such market may not clear. In case of excess supply, each
applicant has the same probability of getting a job.12 The number of workers
equals ￿rms￿demand, so we have
x2 = lx1: (2)
The product market is described by a decreasing inverse demand function
p = P(Q); (3)
8The e⁄ects of ￿nancial development in our model would be ampli￿ed if the amount
of capital invested and the number of employees were a function of one￿ s talent.
9This formalization of entrepreneurial talent follows Lucas (1978), and several subse-
quent occupational choice models (e.g. Gollin (2007)).
10Our conclusions would hold if small businesses and big ￿rms produced di⁄erent goods
and both production functions depended on individual talent.
11Formally, we assume that f(K;:) = 0 for every K < k: Our results would hold as long
as labor is less e¢ cient in one-man businesses than in ￿rms (i.e. (1+l) one-man businesses
produce less than one of the ￿rms, even when such ￿rm is managed by the least talented
individual). In this sense, we talk about more or less e¢ cient production technologies.
12As we will see, there cannot be excess demand in our economy. More sophisticated
reasons for non-market clearing wages are for example in Weiss (1980) and Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984).
6where Q denotes the total output produced for the market. Entrepreneurs
take the price p as given, and inelastically supply their output.
The credit market is competitive, the interest rate r is ￿xed and exoge-
nous. Individuals can ask for a loan (k￿a) in order to set up a ￿rm, but we
assume that only su¢ ciently wealthy individuals can get a loan. The lower
bound on wealth is de￿ned as
a ￿ a￿: (4)
While in Section 5 we derive such threshold as an equilibrium outcome, for
now we take a￿ as exogenous. We say that a country is more ￿nancially
developed the lower is the amount of personal wealth needed as collateral in
order to set up a ￿rm, i.e. the lower is a￿.
3.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, each individual, given his wealth and talent, chooses an
option in order to maximize his expected utility; everyone is given one oc-
cupation, so
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1; (5)
and the markets function according to equations (2), (3) and (4).
In order to characterize such equilibrium, consider ￿rst the choice of an
individual with wealth lower than a￿; who cannot a⁄ord to set up a ￿rm.
Since U2 ￿ U3 irrespective of t; his choice is pretty trivial: he applies for a
job as employee, and, if he is not assigned one, he becomes self-employed.
A more interesting case concerns an individual with wealth greater than a￿:
Given his talent t; he sets up a ￿rm if and only if




where the right hand side is the expected payo⁄of looking for a job (i.e. the
sum of the utility as worker, weighted by the probability to be hired, and as
self-employed, which we have normalized to zero). Equation (6) implicitly
de￿nes a lower bound on the talent of entrepreneurs as
t￿ =
wl + (1 ￿ x1)k
(1 ￿ x1)p
: (7)
Hence, provided that an equilibrium exists, the share of entrepreneurs x1 is
implicitly de￿ned by
x1 = [1 ￿ F(a￿)][1 ￿ G(t￿)]: (8)
We are then interested in identifying the conditions for the existence and
uniqueness of an equilibrium in our economy. We ￿rst notice that the price
7of the good decreases with the share of entrepreneurs in the population, as
shown in the next Lemma.13
Lemma 1 The price p is decreasing in the share of entrepreneurs x1:
We then notice that, given Lemma 1, the minimal talent needed to run
pro￿tably a ￿rm increases with the share of entrepreneurs x1. In fact, an
higher x1 reduces the incentive to set up a ￿rm both because it increases
competition and because it increases the demand for workers, thereby re-
ducing the probability of ending up self-employed. This is expressed in the
next Lemma.
Lemma 2 The minimal talent t￿ is increasing in the share of entrepreneurs
x1.
Finally, in order to ensure the existence of the equilibrium, we need to
rule out the possibility of excess labor demand. In fact, given that each ￿rm
has to employ l workers, the share of entrepreneurs is bounded above from
1=(1+l): When x1 = 0; setting up a ￿rm is most pro￿table, and by equation






where ￿ p ￿ P(0): We then assume that





which implies that the amount of individuals who prefer to be workers is
always su¢ cient to meet ￿rms￿demand. In fact, since by Lemma 2 the right
hand side of equation (8) is decreasing in x1, x1 never exceeds 1=(1+l) and
so labor demand never exceeds l=(1 + l): Moreover, labor supply is always
(1 ￿ x1); which never falls short of l=(1 + l):
Hence, condition (9) ensure that an equilibrium in our economy exists
and it is unique. Equation (8) uniquely de￿nes the share of entrepreneurs x1
and, together with equations (2) and (5), this characterizes our equilibrium.
We summarize with the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Under condition (9), an equilibrium exists and it is unique.
It is de￿ned by equations (2), (5) and (8).
13All omitted proofs are provided in the Appendix.
84 E⁄ects of ￿nancial development
In our model, ￿nancial development a⁄ects the equilibrium number and av-
erage talent of entrepreneurs. In particular, by relaxing wealth constraints,
￿nancial development allows the poor with high talent to become entre-
preneurs. As a result, the share of entrepreneurs and their average talent
increase. This is formalized in the next Lemma.
Lemma 3 The share of entrepreneurs x1 is increasing in ￿nancial develop-
ment.
This Lemma has a number of implications, which describe the ways in
which an higher rate of productive entrepreneurs generates economic devel-
opment in our setting.
First, ￿nancial development allows more jobs to be created. By in-
creasing labor demand; an increase in ￿nancial development induces more
individuals to become workers and less individuals to become self-employed.
This follows directly from equations (2) and (5).
Second, ￿nancial development induces a more e¢ cient allocation of en-
trepreneurial talent to production technologies. In fact, when credit con-
straints are relaxed, some poor but talented self-employed have the possibil-
ity to leave their one-man businesses and become entrepreneurs and others
have the possibility to become salaried workers. At the same time, the rich
and untalented individuals are induced to leave their ￿rm and look for a
salaried job (see Lemma 2). In this sense, ￿nancial development spurs also
social mobility.
Third, even keeping talent constant, a higher rate of entrepreneurship
and a lower rate of self-employment imply that labor resources in the econ-
omy are applied more e¢ ciently. Hence, total production increase and, as
an immediate corollary, the consumption good becomes cheaper to buy (see
Lemma 1). We summarize these e⁄ects in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 An increase in ￿nancial development induces
a. More individuals to become entrepreneurs and fewer individuals to become
self-employed;
b. A more e¢ cient allocation of entrepreneurial talent to production tech-
nologies;
c. Job creation and social mobility;
d. Higher production and cheaper consumption good.
5 Impediments to ￿nancial development
In this Section we extend the previous setting and derive the level of ￿nancial
development as an equilibrium outcome. The purpose is to address how low
9levels of ￿nancial development may be sustained in equilibrium and how
underdevelopment traps may then arise.
Speci￿cally, we assume that, while entrepreneurial pro￿ts are veri￿able,
credit may be constrained as borrowers need not invest the loan e¢ ciently.
We refer to such ine¢ cient way of investing as capital diversion. Since the
￿rm cannot function if capital investment falls short of k, the borrower either
diverts the entire capital or none of it. Diverting capital requires employing
one￿ s unit of labor (which implies that borrowers cannot get capital to set
up a ￿rm and at the same time look for a job as employees) and it generates
private non veri￿able bene￿ts b > 0: This creates a wedge between private
and social returns from entrepreneurship: given b > 0; an individual may
ask for a loan even if he will have no money to pay it back.
It follows that, when lending money, banks must make sure that capital
is not diverted. An individual with wealth a and talent t prefers not to
divert capital if
tp ￿ wl ￿ r(k ￿ a) ￿ b;
which de￿nes a lower bound on entrepreneurial talent as
~ t =
b + wl + r(k ￿ a)
p
: (10)
If banks could screen applicants according to their talent, the market would
function perfectly as only su¢ ciently talented individuals (those with t ￿ ~ t)
would get a loan and these individuals would never divert capital. This
is however impossible since banks cannot observe entrepreneurial talent.
Alternatively, banks can ask for a level of collateral which is common to
everyone. In fact, notice from (10) that ~ t decreases with a; so the higher is
personal wealth the less likely is that an individual of unknown talent has
incentive to divert capital.
As shown in the next Lemma, banks set this minimal collateral a￿ in
order to make sure that, conditional on asking for a loan, an individual has
no incentive to divert capital. This writes as
~ t ￿ t￿; (11)
or, rearranging in terms of a lower bound on wealth, as




Lemma 4 From condition (12), the equilibrium collateral a￿ is implicitly
de￿ned as a ￿xed point of the function




10Similarly to the previous analysis, we say that a country is more ￿-
nancially developed the lower is the amount of personal wealth needed as
collateral in order to set up a ￿rm. Our main interest is in showing how
in this setting di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial development may be sustained in
equilibrium. In this case, depending on initial conditions, countries may
converge either to an equilibrium with low ￿nancial development, low en-
trepreneurship and low production or to an equilibrium with high ￿nancial
development, high entrepreneurship and high production.
The key mechanism which sustains the possibility of multiple equilibria
is that the higher is the level of collateral needed, the higher is the incentive
to divert capital, since the lower is the share of entrepreneurs and hence the
probability of getting a job, which in turn sustains the need to ask for an
high level of collateral; and vice versa. Formally, this means that h(a￿) is
increasing in a￿:
We simplify the following exposition by assuming that wealth is distrib-
uted uniformly over the interval [0;￿ a]; and we notice that h(a￿) is concave in
a￿: That is, the above e⁄ect is relatively weaker when the required collateral
is very high, since at that level the probability of getting a job is already
very small. These relations are expressed in the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 The function h(a￿) is increasing and concave.
Given the shape de￿ned in Lemma 5, the function h(a￿) can have ei-
ther one, two or no ￿xed point for a￿ 2 (0;k): (see the Example below for
a graphical illustration.) If h(k) < k and h(0) > 0; then equation (13)
uniquely de￿nes an equilibrium level of ￿nancial development a￿ 2 (0;k):
In fact, in this case, banks are never better o⁄ by avoiding lending alto-
gether. Su¢ ciently wealthy individuals, and in particular those with wealth
a ￿ h(k); always invest the capital e¢ ciently and so pay back the loan. On
the other hand, also lending money irrespective of the collateral is not an
equilibrium, since there are always su¢ ciently untalented individuals who
are better o⁄ by getting the loan and diverting capital rather than work-
ing for a wage. Hence, in this case, we have a unique equilibrium and this
equilibrium is stable and interior. That is, irrespective of the initial level of
￿nancial development, the country will converge to a unique a￿ 2 (0;k): In
the next Proposition, we show that a su¢ cient condition for this scenario to
occur is that b 2 (w;k):14
For our purposes, a more interesting case is when h(k) < k and h(0) ￿ 0
since in this case market conditions a⁄ect ￿nancial development, which in
turn a⁄ects market conditions, hence multiple equilibria may arise:15 In
14It is indeed customary (and intuitive) to assume that diversion is ine¢ cient in the
sense that b ￿ k (see for example Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1998)).
15In the Appendix we complete the analysis by considering the remaining cases, which
however show similar mechanisms to the one highlighted here.
11this case, if the ￿nancial market is functioning well and banks lend money
without asking for collateral (a￿ = 0), then this is an equilibrium. In fact,
untalented individuals have the incentive to look for a job as the share of
entrepreneurs is high and so the probability of getting a job is high and
so banks can be con￿dent that only su¢ ciently talented individuals ask for
loans and they pay back. This in turn sustains the fact that no collateral is
needed.
The question is under which conditions a country starting at low levels of
￿nancial development can converge to such attractive scenario. As we show
in the Appendix, if h(a￿) admits either one or two ￿xed points, the economy
can reach the virtuous equilibrium only by jumping at a su¢ ciently high level
of ￿nancial development, while a gradual increase would lead the economy to
get stuck at low levels of ￿nancial development. For the economy to converge
to a￿ = 0 irrespective of the initial level of ￿nancial development, we must
have no interior ￿xed point of h(a￿). In this case, even a country with no
￿nancial market can open up one and converge to a virtuous equilibrium
with many entrepreneurs, many salaried jobs, high production, an e¢ cient
allocation of talent and so on..
The occurrence of this scenario depends very much on such country￿ s
initial conditions. Starting in a situation with no ￿nancial markets, this sce-
nario is more likely to occur the lower is h(k); i.e. when enough individuals
can set up a ￿rm without asking for a loan. This implies that once a ￿nan-
cial market is opened, labor demand is already su¢ ciently high to induce
untalented individuals to look for a job as employees. Hence, banks can
safely extend credit and induce the virtuous equilibrium described above.
Moreover, one may switch from a situation in which this scenario can occur
to a situation in which this scenario cannot occur with a minimal variation
of initial conditions. In particular, in the next Example, we consider the
role of the initial wealth distribution. Before that, we formalize the above
arguments in the next Proposition.
Proposition 3 If b 2 (w;k); then equation (13) uniquely de￿nes an equilib-
rium level of ￿nancial development a￿ 2 (0;k): Otherwise multiple equilibria
may arise, and countries with slightly di⁄erent initial conditions may expe-
rience greatly diverging development paths.
5.1 Example
We now illustrate the mechanics of the above model with a closed form
example. Suppose that talent is distributed uniformly over the interval [0;￿ t]
and wealth is distributed uniformly over the interval [0;￿ a] and that the
price p is exogenous (Lemma 2 and the ensuing analysis would still work if
@P=@x1 = 0). Suppose also that k = 1; b = 0:95; p = 24; w = 1, l = 1 and
￿ t = 0:25: These numbers ensure that h(k) < k and h(0) < 0; which is the
12Figure 1: This Figure plots the function h(a￿)￿a￿ for di⁄erent levels of ￿ a.
The intersection with the horizontal axis represents the set of ￿xed points of
equation (13), i.e. the equilibrium levels of ￿nancial development sustainable
for a given wealth distribution.
most interesting case for our analysis.
We then concentrate on how the equilibrium depends on ￿ a; which de-
scribes the initial wealth distribution. This is crucial as it determines the
fraction of individuals who can set up a ￿rm when access to credit is low or
completely absent. We ￿rst consider which levels of ￿nancial development
can be sustained in equilibrium, as determined by equation (13). Figure 1
reports the results for ￿ a 2 f0:9;0:95;1;1:05;1:1g: (higher ￿ a correspond to
lower curves.)
These curves converge to the same point as a￿ ! 0 since when everyone
can get credit the initial distribution of wealth is irrelevant. When a￿ in-
creases these curves diverge since the lower is ￿ a, the lower is the fraction of
individuals with wealth higher than a￿; the lower is the fraction of entrepre-
neurs, the lower the demand for labor and thus the higher is the incentive
to ask for a loan and divert capital. The intersection of the plotted curves
with the horizontal axis represents the set of ￿xed points of equation (13),
i.e. the equilibrium levels of ￿nancial development sustainable for a given
wealth distribution.
We now see that the lower is ￿ a; the lower is the level of ￿nancial devel-
opment at which a country may end up. Suppose we start in a situation
with no ￿nancial development, in which no borrowing is possible, ^ a = k.
We look at how initial conditions, and in particular initial wealth distrib-
ution, determines such country￿ s development. We see from Figure 1 that
when ￿ a ￿ 0:95; the country gets stuck with a￿ = 0:95 (which equals b in
13our example). For ￿ a 2 (0:95;1:05]; the country gets stuck at some a￿ ￿ 0:5
(where such a￿ increases in ￿ a): When instead ￿ a > 1:05; the country reaches
the virtuous equilibrium with a￿ = 0:
It follows that countries with very similar initial conditions may reach
very di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial development, entrepreneurship and produc-
tion. In our example, a country with ￿ a = 0:95 ends up in an equilibrium
with a￿ = 0:95; x1 = 0 and no market production (Q = 0); while a country
with ￿ a just above 1:05 reaches the virtuous equilibrium. Figure 2 shows such
patterns in our example: Since k = 1, ￿ a = 1 is the threshold above which the
country is su¢ ciently rich to have some individuals who can set up a ￿rm
even without getting a loan. Around such threshold; the equilibrium jumps
abruptly from the minimal level of entrepreneurship x1 = 0 to the maximum
level of entrepreneurship (which in this case is x1 = 0:5 since l = 1.)
Figure 2: This Figure represents the level of entrepreneurship which can
be sustained in equilibrium as one varies the initial wealth distribution (as
described by ￿ a).
6 Conclusion
This paper started with the idea that economic development requires a high
rate of productive entrepreneurs. It has ￿rst developed a simple model to
analyze the interaction between entrepreneurial talent, production technolo-
gies and credit constraints in shaping the process of economic development.
We have shown how, by relaxing credit constraints, ￿nancial development
promotes higher production, job creation, and social mobility.
We have then explored which forces may impede the development of
14a ￿nancial market in a setting in which ￿nancial development depends on
individual incentives to misbehave and these in turn depend on the level
of ￿nancial development. We have discussed in particular the role of ini-
tial wealth distribution in determining the possibility of underdevelopment
traps.
The latter set of results emphasize that while ￿nancial development may
induce economic development in several ways, some of which have been de-
tailed in the above analysis, it is di¢ cult to think of ￿nancial development
as a process occurring in vacuo. That is, attempts to develop credit markets
will be successful under some conditions and unsuccessful under others. As
mentioned in the Introduction, some recent literature has emphasized the
role of inherited institutions and interest groups in determining such con-
ditions. We have instead emphasized standard market conditions, whereby
a large supply of credit can be sustained in equilibrium only when enough
entrepreneurs have started their business and labor demand is high enough
to assure that capital will be invested e¢ ciently. In this respect, our analy-
sis suggests that complementarities are likely to arise between labor market
and ￿nancial market development.
These dynamics also show that there are situations in which a gradual
improvement in ￿nancial development is bound to be unsuccessful. If mar-
kets are not functioning well and individuals have incentive to misbehave,
￿nancial development will bounce back to its original low levels. This makes
precise a sense in which, in these situations, the country needs a big push
in order to escape the poverty trap.
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177 Omitted Proofs
Lemma 1 The price p is decreasing in the share of entrepreneurs x1:
Proof. The output writes
Q = nx1^ t; (14)
where ^ t is the average talent of an entrepreneur, as determined in equilib-
rium. Di⁄erentiating equation (14) we write
@Q
@x1









In fact, since t is bounded below from t; @^ t=@x1 always exceeds (t ￿ ^ t)=x1:
Since t ￿ 0; equation (15) is positive. Given equation (3) p decreases with
the output Q, so we have shown that p decreases in x1:
Lemma 2 The minimal talent t￿ is increasing in the share of entre-
preneurs x1.










[wl + (1 ￿ x1)k]:
The ￿rst term is positive and due to Lemma 1 the second term is also
positive. Hence, t￿ increases in x1.
Lemma 3 The share of entrepreneurs x1 is increasing in ￿nancial
development.










The numerator measures the change in individuals who can a⁄ord to become
entrepreneurs. The denominator tells how the mass of individuals who are
su¢ ciently talented and so willing to be entrepreneurs changes as x1 in-
creases. Given Lemma 2, @t￿=@x1 is positive and hence @x1=@a￿ is negative.
Hence, the higher is ￿nancial development (i.e. the lower a￿), the higher is
the share of entrepreneurs x1:
18Lemma 4 From condition (12), the equilibrium collateral a￿ is im-
plicitly de￿ned as a ￿xed point of the function




Proof. There are a priori two ways in which the collateral requirement
a￿ can be set. The ￿rst is to make sure that even the least talented individual
would have no incentive to divert capital, i.e. to set the minimal a such that
~ t ￿ t: (16)
Rearranging in terms of a lower bound on wealth, this writes as
a ￿ b + wl + rk ￿ tp: (17)
A second condition is that, conditional on asking for a loan, an individual
has no incentive to divert capital, i.e. to set the minimal a such that ~ t ￿ t￿;
which is condition (12) in the text. To see which of the two conditions
determines the level of collateral a￿, notice that (17) implies (12). In fact,
by (9) we have that 1￿G(t￿) ￿ 1 for every t￿: By de￿nition, 1￿G(t) = 1; so it
must be that t < t￿. Moreover, notice that our assumption of competition in
the credit market ensures that in equilibrium a￿ is chosen as the minimum
collateral required to make sure that capital is not diverted. Hence, the
lowest level of collateral needed to get a loan is determined by condition
(12).
Lemma 5 The function h(a￿) is increasing and concave.







































Hence, h(a￿) is increasing and concave.
Proposition 3 If b 2 (w;k); then equation (13) uniquely de￿nes an
equilibrium level of ￿nancial development a￿ 2 (0;k): Otherwise multiple
equilibria may arise, and countries with slightly di⁄erent initial conditions
may experience greatly diverging development paths.
Proof. In order to characterize the levels of ￿nancial development aris-
ing in equilibrium, denote any equilibrium candidate as ^ a. Consider ^ a = 0,
so that F(^ a) = 0: Denote the corresponding minimal entrepreneurial tal-
ent, as expressed in equation (7), as tmax and the corresponding share of
entrepreneurs as
￿ x1 ￿ 1 ￿ G(tmax):
Similarly consider ^ a = k, and denote the corresponding minimal entrepre-
neurial talent as tmin and the corresponding share of entrepreneurs as




h(0) ￿ b ￿
l￿ x1
1 ￿ ￿ x1




If b ￿ k; then h(k) < k; which implies that ^ a = k cannot be an equilibrium.
If, b > w then h(0) > 0; which implies that ^ a = 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
In this case, condition (12) de￿nes a unique equilibrium and this equilibrium
is stable and interior. If instead h(k) > k and h(0) > 0; then there is no
interior ￿xed point and the country converges to a￿ = k irrespective of
initial conditions. Suppose instead that h(k) > k and h(0) < 0; then there
is one interior ￿xed point, call it a￿
1; which is however unstable. Starting
from any level of ￿nancial development such that ^ a > a￿
1; the economy
converges to an equilibrium with no ￿nancial development a￿ = k while
starting at any ^ a < a￿
1 the economy converges to the virtuous equilibrium
with high ￿nancial development a￿ = 0. Finally, suppose that h(k) < k
and h(0) ￿ 0: In this case, a￿ = 0 is an equilibrium and a￿ = k is not an
equilibrium. Given Lemma 5, h(a￿) can have either one, two or no ￿xed
point for a￿ 2 (0;k): Suppose ￿rst that the interior ￿xed point is unique and
call it a￿
2: In this case, the economy converges to a￿ = a￿
2 for any ^ a ￿ a￿
2
and converges to a￿ = 0 for any ^ a < a￿
2. A similar scenario occurs when





4: In this case, starting from any level of ￿nancial development such
that ^ a > a￿
4; the economy converges to an equilibrium with low ￿nancial
development a￿ = a￿
3 while starting at any ^ a < a￿
4 the economy converges to
the virtuous equilibrium. Finally, if there is no interior ￿xed point of h(a￿);
the economy converges to a￿ = 0 irrespective of the initial level of ￿nancial
development. Notice the last scenario is more likely to occur the lower is
h(k) and so in particular the higher is x1: From equation (18), this is more
likely to occur when F(k) is low.
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